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Abstract: This paper empirically investigates how far free trade agreements (FTAs) successfully 
lower tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for manufacturing industries by employing the 
bilateral tariff and NTB data in a time series for countries around the world. We find that FTAs 
under GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause contribute to reducing tariff rates by 2.1% 
points and 1.5% points, respectively. In the case of NTBs, their respective impacts are 6.6% points 
and 5.7% points. Membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not contribute greatly 
to reducing tariff rates but does play a significant role in reducing NTBs. These results provide 
important implications for the literature on numerical assessments of FTAs. 
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1. Introduction 
     Trade liberalization through free trade agreements (FTAs) has recently played a 
central role in enhancing trade in the world. By May 2012, around 500 FTAs, counting 
goods and services notifications separately, had been notified to the WTO. From the 
viewpoint of tariff elimination, FTA member countries can enjoy the use of 
preferential tariff rates, which are lower than general tariff rates such as most favoured 
nation rates (MFN rates) in trading among FTA members. Also, FTAs contribute to 
reducing non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The scope of recent FTAs has significantly been 
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broadened. Although the elimination of tariffs continues to be one of the major 
purposes, new FTAs tend to include provisions for various policy modes such as the 
mobility of persons, government procurement, competition policy, intellectual property 
rights protection, E-commerce, dispute settlement, labor standards, environmental 
policy, technical cooperation, institutional mechanisms, and so on. Some of these 
provisions will play a role in reducing NTBs among FTA members. As a result, such 
reduction of tariff rates and non-tariff barriers has led to a recent remarkable increase 
in world trade. 
     In the academic literature, a vast number of scholars have evaluated the trade 
creation effects of FTAs. In the ex-ante evaluation, a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model simulation is often conducted, which is the most widely utilized method 
to assess economic impacts of possible FTAs. In particular, many studies based on 
CGE models use variations of the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model. Such 
studies include those reviewed by Baldwin and Venables (1995), Park (2006), and 
Plummer and Wignaraja (2006). The recent CGE studies try to take care of not only 
tariff elimination but also the elimination of NTBs in possible scenarios of FTAs (e.g., 
Ando, 2009; Winchester, 2009; Petri et al., 2011). Those studies concluded that gains 
from FTAs would be much larger when both tariffs and NTBs are eliminated than 
when only tariffs are removed. 
On the other hand, the ex-post evaluation often focuses on the existence of trade 
creation effects, namely positive impacts of FTAs on international trade. Such effects 
have been quantified by applying international trade data to the well-known gravity 
equation, which includes FTA dummy variables taking unity if trading partners belong 
to the same FTA and zero otherwise (e.g., Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Caporale et al., 
2009; Medvedev, 2010; Roy, 2010; and Vicard, 2009). In this sort of analysis, the 
coefficient for the FTA dummy represents total trade creation effects of FTAs, which 
are often proved to be significantly positive. In other words, these studies capture the 
sum of the impacts of tariff elimination and NTB reduction. Some other findings in 
these studies are also of interest. First, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find that about half 
of the trade enhancing effect occurs during the first half of the typical 10-year interim 
period. Second, while Roy (2010) claims that the trade creation effect is larger in 
customs unions than in free trade agreements, Vicard (2009) finds that the magnitude 
of trade creation effects is not significantly different no matter what the type of FTAs 
is, including preferential arrangements, free trade agreements, and customs unions. 
This paper is believed to be the first one that investigates the direct relation of 
tariff rates and NTBs with FTAs. Specifically, we examine how much FTAs have 
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succeeded in reducing tariff rates and NTBs separately. It is important to know the 
actual amount of reduction particularly for the more precise ex-ante investigation of 
FTA impacts. For example, Ando (2009) assumes in an ad hoc manner that trade 
facilitation measures lead to the enhancement of efficiency by 10%. Winchester (2009) 
assumes in his CGE simulation that FTA members’ NTBs are completely eliminated. 
Petri et al. (2011) determine the magnitude of NTB reduction by scoring subjectively 
the coverage of 24 issues (e.g., dispute settlement) in the agreement and assume around 
30%-60% reduction of NTBs. However, we do not know how far FTAs could actually 
reduce member countries’ NTBs. It is unlikely that FTAs completely eliminate NTBs 
among the member countries. Our estimates on the reduction of NTBs by FTAs will 
provide a magnitude of reference when simulating the impacts of NTB reduction. 
Our estimates on the reduction in tariff rates and NTBs through FTAs will also 
be useful to comprehend the above-mentioned findings in the ex-post studies. For 
example, our estimates may provide a clue to whether trade creation effects are due to 
tariff elimination or NTB reduction. Furthermore, examining the pattern of reductions 
in tariff rates and NTBs by different FTA types will contribute to uncovering 
differences in FTA impacts. Our estimates also yield information on FTAs’ phase-in 
effects by examining reductions in tariff rates and NTBs during the years after the 
FTAs’ entry into force. Our analysis thus makes the interpretation of gravity findings 
richer. 
The difficulty of this study lies obviously in the data availability. However, 
recently, there have been some efforts toward the construction of databases of tariff 
rates and NTBs. We draw data on tariff rates from the World Integrated Trade Solution 
(WITS)1 database developed by the World Bank, UNCTAD, International Trade 
Center (ITC), United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD), and World Trade 
Organization (WTO). This database includes detailed data on tariff rates in more than 
200 countries from the year 1988. Basically, the bilateral tariff data on all available 
schemes (for example, not only MFN and FTAs but also the generalised system of 
preferences (GSP)) are ready to use. On the other hand, the data on NTBs are obtained 
from the ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database, which includes country-pair 
specific NTBs for 158 countries during 1995-2010. These NTBs are estimated by 
employing the method proposed by Novy (2013). These data on tariff rates and NTBs 
are useful for examining the direct relation with FTAs. 
In addition to FTAs, we also examine reductions in tariff rates and NTBs 
through WTO participation. The WTO has played a central role in enhancing trade 
                                                   
1 http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/. 
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around the world. After Rose (2004a), several studies were conducted on the trade 
creation effects of the WTO; see Chang and Lee (2007), Rose (2004b, 2005a, 2005b), 
Engelbrecht and Pearce (2007), Subramanian and Wei (2007), and Tomz, Goldstein, 
and Rivers (2007). Most of the studies employ the gravity equation to quantify the 
impacts of WTO membership on trade. Empirical evidence remains mixed.2 Some 
studies find significantly positive impacts of WTO membership on trade, while others 
do not. Also in the case of WTO impacts, the main sources of trade creation effects 
should be coming from the reduction in both tariff rates and NTBs. Our study is the 
one that directly examines the existence of such sources of trade creation effects by the 
WTO. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our 
data sources and databases on tariff rates and NTBs. Section 3 reports the main 
empirical results on how much FTAs lower tariff rates and NTBs. Some more 
interesting findings in the extension of empirical studies are presented in Section 4. 
Last, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Databases on Tariffs and NTBs 
 
2.1. Tariff Database 
We draw all tariff data from TRAINS raw data provided by the WITS. As 
mentioned in the introductory section, the data include tariff rates in all available tariff 
schemes in more than 200 countries from the year 1988. In order to identify exactly all 
tariff schemes available for each country pair, we collect the information of the WTO, 
FTA member countries, and GSP beneficiaries, which is obtained from the WTO 
website, the Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTAIS),3 and several 
documents from the UNCTAD website4 and official documents on websites of each 
country’s national customs agency, respectively. Then, at a tariff-line level, we select 
                                                   
2 Several studies by Andrew Rose cannot find robust positive impacts of WTO membership. 
Engelbrecht and Pearce (2007) and Subramanian and Wei (2007) analyze the impacts of the WTO 
membership on agricultural trade and find negatively significant impacts. Tomz, Goldstein, and 
Rivers (2007) conduct a careful gravity analysis by including zero trade and controlling for 
multilateral resistance but do not find robust positive impacts of WTO membership. On the other 
hand, Chang and Lee (2007) employ the propensity score matching method to tackle endogeneity 
and specification error in gravity exercises. As a result, they find robust positive impacts of WTO 
membership on trade. 
3 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx. 
4 http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1418&lang=1. 
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the lowest tariff rates among all schemes available for each country pair. 5  We 
aggregate all tariff-line level data at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) 
1992 by using the converter tables in HS1992, HS1996, HS2002, and HS2007.6 We 
take a simple average in aggregation. For missing data, we insert the most recent 
historical rates available.  
There are some notes on data construction. First, for simplicity, we treat non-ad 
valorem tariff rates as missing. Also, we use ad valorem tariff rates in the case of 
mixed tariffs. Second, in our tariff database, only GSP beneficiaries identifiable in 
these documents are taken into account. Although lists of beneficiary countries are 
available for a specific year for each country, changes may occur—i.e., countries may 
graduate from being GSP beneficiaries. Therefore, the possibility of under-counting or 
over-counting GSP beneficiaries exists. Due to the same reason, we do not take fully 
into account country-product graduation from GSP schemes. Third, some countries do 
not necessarily report all tariff schemes. For example, countries that conclude an FTA 
might not report FTA preferential rates, particularly in the year when it enters into 
force. In this case, we may overestimate the lowest tariff rates. 
In this paper, we focus on tariff rates in manufacturing industries. Specifically, 
our tariff rates at the six-digit level of HS1992 are converted to those at the two-digit 
level of ISIC Revision 3 (ISIC Revision 3, 15-36).7 We take a simple average for this 
aggregation. Our focus on the manufacturing industries obviously decreases the 
magnitude of the above-mentioned underestimation in our treatment in non-ad valorem 
tariff rates because non-ad valorem tariff rates and mix tariff rates are mostly set for 
non-manufacturing industries, particularly agricultural goods. In order to have an 
enough number of sample importing countries in each year, we focus on the tariff rates 
during 1997-2010. As a result, our tariff data are not balanced-panel and consist of 178 
countries (see Appendix).8 
 
2.2. NTBs Database 
                                                   
5 Namely, we assume that exporters always use the schemes with the lowest tariff rates though, in 
the real world, some exporters may be forced to use higher general tariff rates, such as MFN rates, 
because some fixed costs are incurred in using preferential tariff schemes (Demidova and Krishna, 
2008).  
6 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/conversions/HS%20Correlation%20and%20Conversion%20tables.
htm. 
7 The conversion table is available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.asp?Lg=1. 
8 For more details on the construction of the tariff database, see Hayakawa (2013). 
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     We totally rely on the ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database to obtain the 
data on NTBs.9 This database includes “comprehensive trade costs,” τij, which are 
calculated based on the formula derived in Novy (2013); 
𝜏𝑖𝑗 = �𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑗 − 1 = �𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖� 12(σ−1) − 1, 
where τij is geometric average comprehensive trade costs between countries i and j. tij 
and xij are trade costs from countries i to j and country i’s consumption of products 
from country j. σ denotes elasticity of substitution. The database also includes the 
geometric average of tariff rates, TRij; 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗 = ��1 + Tariff𝑖𝑗� ∙ �1 + Tariff𝑗𝑖�, 
where Tariffij denotes the simple average effective tariff rates in country i against 
products from country j.  
NTBs are then calculated at a tariff-equivalent basis (%) as follows: 
𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 100 ∙ �1 + �𝜏𝑖𝑗 100⁄ �𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗 − 1�. 
This measure of NTBs includes all additional costs other than tariff costs involved in 
trading goods bilaterally rather than domestically. In order to maximize sample 
countries, we use the data of NTBs in which missing observations are filled in by 
employing the linear interpolation method (also obtainable from the ESCAP-World 
Bank Trade Cost Database). Finally, as mentioned in the introductory section, this 
NTBs database includes country-pair specific NTBs for 158 countries during 
1995-2010. For the analysis presented below, we use NTBs for the manufacturing 
industry, in which the elasticity is set to eight in the database. 
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
     This section first takes a casual look at the average of tariff rates and NTBs 
according to FTA status. Then, we conduct some regression analyses. 
 
3.1. The First Look 
                                                   
9 For more details, see “Note for Users,” which is available on the following website: 
 http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/db/usernote-2012.pdf. 
Also, for other measures on NTBs, see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). 
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     Table 1 reports the simple average of tariff rates and NTBs according to the FTA 
status one year after its entry into force. Specifically, we consider two kinds of FTAs 
separately: FTAs under GATT Article XXIV and FTAs based on the Enabling Clause. 
From this table, we can see that both tariff rates and NTBs between FTA member 
countries in general, i.e., GATT24 (t−1) / Enabling Clause (t−1), are lower than those 
between countries not linked with any FTAs. The tariff rates are 9% between FTA 
members and 10% between countries not linked with any FTAs, while the NTBs are 
155% between FTA members and 231% between countries not linked with any FTAs. 
Although the difference in tariff rates is small, the lower tariff rates and NTBs between 
FTA member countries are consistent with our expectation. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
     The table also shows that both tariff rates and NTBs are much lower between 
members of FTAs under GATT Article XXIV, at 4% and 121%, respectively. Thus, 
those members clearly have low tariff rates and NTBs. On the other hand, while NTBs 
are clearly lower between members of FTAs based on the Enabling Clause, tariff rates 
are higher between those members than between countries not linked with any FTAs. 
After all, these higher tariff rates are obviously due to selection effects of FTAs based 
on the Enabling Clause. Those FTAs are mainly for developing countries, which 
originally have much higher tariff rates. Thus, even after the conclusion of FTAs, such 
developing countries still have high tariff rates on average. This result suggests to us 
the necessity of controlling for the selection effects of FTAs in evaluating the reduction 
of tariff rates (and NTBs) through FTAs. 
 
3.2. Regression Analysis 
     Simple analysis of the average of tariff rates and NTBs in the previous 
subsection suggests the necessity of controlling for the selection effects of FTAs. 
Indeed, it is well known in the gravity literature that the FTA dummy variable is not an 
exogenous variable so that its coefficient suffers from endogeneity biases. Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) closely examine this issue. One possible way of addressing the 
endogeneity is the use of instruments. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) tried a wide array 
of economic and political instrument variables. However, they conclude that the 
instrument variable method is not a reliable method because of the lack of suitable 
instruments. Most of the variables that are correlated in cross-section with the 
probability of having an FTA are also correlated in cross-section with trade flows. As a 
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result, they demonstrate that the most plausible estimates of the FTA impacts on 
international trade are obtained from a gravity estimation using panel data with 
bilateral fixed effects. This estimation enables us to isolate the FTA impacts on 
bilateral international trade from any time-invariant country-pair-specific elements, 
some of which are related with the decision on the conclusion of the FTA and bilateral 
international trade as demonstrated by Baier and Bergstrand (2004). 
A similar story applies to our context. For example, elements having influence 
on tariff rates, e.g., historical ties, may affect the decision on the FTA conclusion. If so, 
the simple regression of tariff rates on FTA dummy variables yields biased estimates. 
As is done in the gravity literature, we account for this issue by including country pair 
dummy variables. The regression of tariff rates (and NTBs) on FTA dummy variables 
with controlling time-invariant country-pair specific elements will tackle this selection 
issue. Also, in order to control for unobservable time-specific effects, we introduce 
year dummies. 
The estimation results for tariff rates and NTBs are reported in Table 2. As 
shown in columns (I) and (IV), FTAs in general reduce tariff rates by 1.9% points and 
NTBs by 6.4% points. Column (II) shows that FTAs under GATT Article XXIV and 
the Enabling Clause contribute to reducing tariff rates by 2.1% points and 1.5% points, 
respectively. It is interesting that FTAs under GATT Article XXIV have a larger effect 
than those based on the Enabling Clause, maybe because the former FTAs require 
member countries to achieve a high degree of liberalization (discussed later). Column 
(V) shows that FTAs under GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause contribute to 
reducing NTBs by 6.6% points and 5.7% points, respectively. Again, we find a larger 
reduction of NTBs by FTAs under GATT Article XXIV than by FTAs based on the 
Enabling Clause. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
 
4. Further Analyses 
     This section presents some more results of our estimation. We first examine the 
reduction due to the WTO in addition to that due to FTAs. Second, we conduct some 
robustness checks. Third, we examine the reduction of tariff rates through FTAs by 
industry. Last, the time-series pattern of the reduction of tariff rates and NTBs through 
FTAs is investigated. 
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4.1. WTO and GSP 
     We examine the reduction of tariff rates and NTBs through not only FTAs but 
also joining the WTO. To do this, we introduce a WTO dummy variable, which takes 
one if both the exporter and the importer are WTO members and zero otherwise. In the 
case of tariff rates, we also introduce a GSP dummy variable, which takes one if the 
exporter is a beneficiary of the importer’s GSP and zero otherwise, because the GSP 
program is also one of the important preferential tariff schemes. The results are 
reported in column (III) in Tables 2 and 3. The coefficients for FTAs under GATT 
Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause are not quantitatively and qualitatively changed 
much. While WTO membership reduces tariff rates by 0.5% points and has smaller 
impacts than FTAs, the reduction of tariff rates though the GSP is 3.4% points and is 
much larger than that through FTAs. On the other hand, NTBs are reduced through 
joining the WTO by 15.6% points, which is a much larger reduction than in the case of 
FTAs. These results can be summarized as follow. The WTO does not contribute 
greatly to reducing tariff rates but does play a significant role in reducing NTBs. The 
introduction of WTO rules such as GATT Article XIII (Non-discriminatory 
Administration of Quantitative Restrictions) or Article XVII (State Trading 
Enterprises) will account for such significant reduction of NTBs through joining the 
WTO. In addition, the GSP program seems to succeed in granting good market access 
to developing countries. 
 
4.2. Robustness 
     In this subsection, we conduct some robustness checks. First, we take a log of 
tariff rates and NTBs because of two kinds of concern. One is that some countries, 
particularly developed countries, already have low tariff rates and NTBs and thus do 
not have much room to reduce those. Therefore, estimates of reduction through FTAs 
might not be precise in the case of those countries. The other is that, as is well known, 
FTAs under GATT Article XXIV require member countries to eliminate tariffs in 
“substantially” all the trade between member countries. In order to tackle these kinds 
of concern, we focus on percentage changes rather than percent point changes by 
employing the log-version of dependent variables. The results in the case of the 
log-version are reported in Table 3 and are not qualitatively changed. FTAs under 
GATT Article XXIV reduce tariff rates and NTBs more than FTAs under the Enabling 
Clause. The reduction in tariff rates is largest in the case of the GSP. The effect of 
WTO membership is trivial in the case of tariff rates but large in the case of NTBs. 
 
 10 
===   Table 3   === 
 
     Second, in order to tackle the above two kinds of concern more directly, we 
restrict sample countries only to developing countries. This restriction also contributes 
to accounting for another problem, the way of calculating NTBs. The NTBs are 
calculated by employing the geometric average trade costs and the geometric average 
of tariff rates. Thus, in the case between developed and developing countries, where 
many asymmetric tariff rates are likely to exist, NTBs may not be precisely computed. 
As a result, we estimate our models only for developing countries, specifically 
non-OECD countries.10 We do not take logs of tariff rates and NTBs. The results are 
reported in Table 4 and show larger impacts than those in Table 2. Specifically, FTAs 
in general reduce tariff rates and NTBs by 2.3% points and 8.5% points, respectively. 
FTAs under GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause contribute to reducing tariff 
rates by 2.5% points and 2.1% points, respectively. In the case of NTBs, their 
respective impacts are 8.1% points and 9.0% points.  
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
4.3. Impacts on Tariff Rates by Industry 
We examine the reduction of tariff rates by industry (two-digit level of ISIC 
Revision 3).11 We estimate our model as in column (III) in Table 2, by industry. The 
results are reported in Table 5. Four major points should be noted. First, the GSP 
makes the largest contribution to reducing tariff rates in all industries. Second, there 
are some insignificant coefficients. FTAs based on the Enabling Clause do not have an 
influence on tariff rates in the office machinery industry, and WTO membership does 
not reduce tariff rates on rubber and plastic products and electrical machinery products. 
Third, the magnitude relation in reducing tariff rates between FTAs under GATT 
Article XXIV and those based on the Enabling Clause differs by industry. Last, the 
impacts of FTAs on tariff rates are large in food products and tobacco products but are 
small in machinery industries including general machinery, electric machinery, 
transport equipment, and precision machinery products. 
 
                                                   
10 OECD countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
11 The data on NTBs are not available by industry. 
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===   Table 5   === 
 
4.4. Time-series Changes 
     Last, we explore time-series changes of the reduction in tariff rates and NTBs 
through FTAs. Specifically, we estimate our model as in columns (III) and (VI) in 
Table 2 by including not only one-year lagged FTA dummy variables but also up to 
fifteen-year lagged variables simultaneously. The coefficients for those lagged dummy 
variables in addition to the 95% confidence interval are depicted in Figures 1-4. For 
example, the coefficients for one-year-lagged and two-year-lagged GATT24 variables 
in the equation for tariff rates are estimated to be −1.0 and −1.1, respectively. This 
means that the cumulative effects of GATT Article XXIV on tariff rates up to two years 
after their entry into force are −2.1 (−1.0 plus −1.1). 
 
===   Figures 1-4   === 
 
Our findings from these figures are as follow. Through FTAs under GATT 
Article XXIV, tariff rates are greatly reduced one or two years after their entry into 
force. We can see the lagged and further reduction six to eight years after their entry 
into force. Also, tariff rates are greatly reduced through FTAs under the Enabling 
Clause four years after their entry into force. A relatively large further reduction can be 
found six years after their entry into force. These “twin-peak” shapes in the case of 
tariff rates may be because, in most FTAs, the timing of the start of tariff reduction and 
the speed of tariff reduction differ for products listed in normal track lists and sensitive 
lists. On the other hand, the small reduction in NTBs through FTAs under GATT 
Article XXIV can be found every year after their entry into force, while the reduction 
of NTBs through FTAs under the Enabling Clause is detected two, three, and seven 
years after their entry into force. 
      
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
     This paper empirically investigates the degree to which FTAs succeed in 
lowering bilateral tariff rates and NTBs in manufacturing industries on average. Our 
findings are summarized as follow. FTAs under GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling 
Clause contribute to reducing tariff rates by 2.1% points and 1.5% points, respectively. 
In the case of NTBs, on the other hand, their respective impacts are 6.6% points and 
5.7% points. Also, WTO membership does not contribute greatly to reducing tariff 
 12 
rates but does play a significant role in reducing NTBs. These results provide some 
implications for the literature of ex-ante and ex-post analyses of FTAs. First, our 
estimates on the reduction particularly of NTBs through FTAs contribute to serving as 
a reference magnitude when simulating the impacts of FTAs. Second, if we assume 
that a one percent reduction in tariff rates and NTBs increases trade by the same 
proportion, our results showing a larger reduction in NTBs implies that the main 
source of FTAs’ trade creation effects is the reduction of NTBs rather than reduction of 
tariff rates.  
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Appendix. Sample Countries 
Country Tariff NTBs Country Tariff NTBs
Afghanistan YES YES Dominica YES YES
Angola YES NO Denmark YES YES
Albania YES YES Dominican Republic YES YES
United Arab Emirates YES YES Algeria YES YES
Argentina YES YES Ecuador YES YES
Armenia YES YES Egypt YES YES
Antigua and Barbuda YES YES Eritrea YES YES
Australia YES YES Spain YES YES
Austria YES YES Estonia YES YES
Azerbaijan YES YES Ethiopia YES NO
Burundi YES YES Finland YES YES
Belgium and Luxembourg YES YES Fiji YES YES
Benin YES YES France YES YES
Burkina Faso YES YES Gabon YES YES
Bangladesh YES YES United Kingdom YES YES
Bulgaria YES YES Georgia YES YES
Bahrain YES YES Ghana YES YES
Bahamas NO YES Guinea YES YES
Bosnia and Herzegovina YES YES Gambia YES YES
Belarus YES YES Guinea-Bissau YES NO
Belize YES YES Equatorial Guinea YES NO
Bermuda YES NO Greece YES YES
Bolivia YES YES Grenada YES YES
Brazil YES YES Guatemala YES YES
Barbados YES YES Guyana YES YES
Brunei Darussalam YES YES Hong Kong YES YES
Bhutan YES YES Honduras YES YES
Botswana YES YES Croatia YES YES
Central African Republic YES YES Haiti YES NO
Canada YES YES Hungary YES YES
Switzerland YES YES Indonesia YES YES
Chile YES YES India YES YES
China YES YES Ireland YES YES
C e d'Ivoire YES YES Iran YES YES
Cameroon YES YES Iceland YES YES
Congo YES NO Israel YES YES
Colombia YES YES Italy YES YES
Comoros YES NO Jamaica YES YES
Cape Verde YES YES Jordan YES YES
Costa Rica YES YES Japan YES YES
Cuba YES YES Kazakstan YES YES
Cyprus YES YES Kenya YES YES
Czech Republic YES YES Kyrgyzstan YES YES
Germany YES YES Cambodia YES YES
Djibouti YES NO Saint Kitts and Nevis YES YES  
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(continue) 
Country Tariff NTBs Country Tariff NTBs
Korea YES YES Paraguay YES YES
Kuwait YES YES French Polynesia YES NO
Lao PDR YES NO Qatar YES YES
Lebanon YES YES Romania YES YES
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya YES NO Russian Federation YES YES
Saint Lucia YES YES Rwanda YES YES
Sri Lanka YES YES Saudi Arabia YES YES
Lesotho YES YES Sudan YES YES
Lithuania YES YES Senegal YES YES
Luxembourg YES YES Singapore YES YES
Latvia YES YES Solomon Islands YES NO
Macau (Aomen) YES YES El Salvador YES YES
Morocco YES YES Suriname YES YES
Moldova, Rep.of YES YES Slovakia YES YES
Madagascar YES YES Slovenia YES YES
Maldives YES YES Sweden YES YES
Mexico YES YES Swaziland YES YES
Macedonia YES YES Seychelles YES YES
Mali YES YES Syrian Arab Republic YES YES
Malta YES YES Chad YES NO
Burma YES NO Togo YES YES
Mongolia YES YES Thailand YES YES
Mozambique YES YES Tajikistan YES NO
Mauritania YES YES Turkmenistan YES YES
Montserrat YES NO Tonga YES YES
Mauritius YES YES Trinidad and Tobago YES YES
Malawi YES YES Tunisia YES YES
Malaysia YES YES Turkey YES YES
Namibia YES YES Taiwan YES NO
Niger YES YES Tanzania, United Rep. of YES YES
Nigeria YES YES Uganda YES YES
Nicaragua YES YES Ukraine YES YES
Netherlands YES YES Uruguay YES YES
Norway YES YES United States of America YES YES
Nepal YES YES Uzbekistan YES NO
New Zealand YES YES Saint Vincent and the Grenadines YES YES
Oman YES YES Venezuela YES YES
Pakistan YES YES Viet Nam YES YES
Panama YES YES Vanuatu YES YES
Peru YES YES Yemen YES YES
Philippines YES YES South Africa YES YES
Palau YES NO Congo YES NO
Papua New Guinea YES YES Zambia YES YES
Poland YES YES Zimbabwe YES YES
Portugal YES YES  
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Table 1. Average Rates (%) 
Tariff Rates NTBs
GATT24 (t−1) / Enabling Clause (t−1) 9 155
GATT24 (t−1) 4 121
Enabling Clause (t−1) 12 199
No FTAs (t−1) 10 231  
Note: We calculate the simple average of tariff rates and NTBs according to FTA status one year after its entry into force. 
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Table 2. Results for All Manufacturing 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
GATT24 (t−1) / Enabling Clause (t−1) -1.884*** -6.430***
[0.136] [1.952]
GATT24 (t−1) -2.084*** -1.941*** -6.612*** -6.067***
[0.124] [0.122] [1.861] [1.844]
Enabling Clause (t−1) -1.502*** -1.582*** -5.679* -5.104*
[0.189] [0.182] [3.029] [3.039]
WTO -0.481*** -15.639***
[0.087] [1.849]
GSP -3.393***
[0.076]
Pair Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observaitons 340,725 340,725 340,725 68,456 68,456 68,456
Tariff Rates NTBs
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Results for All Manufacturing: A Log Version 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
GATT24 (t−1) / Enabling Clause (t−1) -0.018*** -0.022***
[0.001] [0.005]
GATT24 (t−1) -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.019***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005]
Enabling Clause (t−1) -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.022***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.008]
WTO -0.005*** -0.051***
[0.001] [0.005]
GSP -0.033***
[0.001]
Pair Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observaitons 340,725 340,725 340,725 68,456 68,456 68,456
Tariff Rates NTBs
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Results for Non-OECD Countries 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
GATT24 (t−1) / Enabling Clause (t−1) -2.315*** -8.454**
[0.271] [4.051]
GATT24 (t−1) -2.542*** -8.117**
[0.243} [3.738]
Enabling Clause (t−1) -2.083*** -8.977*
[0.360] [5.401]
Pair Dummy YES YES YES YES
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES
Observaitons 210,353 210,353 26,238 26,238
Tariff Rates NTBs
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Results by Industry (Two-digit Level of ISIC Revision 3): Impacts on Tariff Rates 
Coef. S.D. Coef. S.D. Coef. S.D. Coef. S.D.
Food products and beverages -3.972*** [0.489] -5.726*** [0.637] -0.676*** [0.165] -11.656*** [0.277]
Tobacco products -7.518*** [0.852] -10.010*** [0.837] 4.134*** [0.394] -22.082*** [1.053]
Textiles -3.091*** [0.187] -2.470*** [0.276] -1.495*** [0.144] -3.422*** [0.115]
Wearing apparel -3.637*** [0.233] -3.054*** [0.349] -1.433*** [0.163] -4.652*** [0.121]
Tanning and dressing of leather -2.655*** [0.162] -2.334*** [0.238] -0.667*** [0.112] -3.085*** [0.088]
Wood and wood products -1.975*** [0.155] -1.640*** [0.211] -0.884*** [0.106] -2.437*** [0.077]
Paper and paper products -2.034*** [0.145] -1.579*** [0.186] -0.680*** [0.104] -3.036*** [0.091]
Publishing and printing -1.434*** [0.109] -0.941*** [0.137] -0.804*** [0.068] -1.861*** [0.052]
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel -0.768*** [0.092] -0.246** [0.100] 0.118* [0.063] -1.027*** [0.041]
Chemicals and chemical products -1.476*** [0.109] -0.803*** [0.140] -0.332*** [0.080] -1.963*** [0.064]
Rubber and plastics products -2.306*** [0.152] -1.631*** [0.201] -0.078 [0.099] -2.927*** [0.089]
Other non-metallic mineral products -2.191*** [0.144] -1.917*** [0.200] -0.471*** [0.098] -3.280*** [0.071]
Basic metals -1.264*** [0.112] -0.680*** [0.131] -0.218*** [0.070] -1.820*** [0.063]
Fabricated metal products -1.868*** [0.136] -1.299*** [0.181] -0.262*** [0.093] -2.759*** [0.080]
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. -1.117*** [0.096] -0.503*** [0.130] -0.180** [0.072] -2.385*** [0.068]
Office, accounting and computing machinery -0.679*** [0.109] -0.137 [0.143] -0.868*** [0.091] -1.064*** [0.050]
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. -1.727*** [0.131] -1.146*** [0.170] 0.021 [0.093] -2.502*** [0.072]
Radio, television and communication equipment -1.373*** [0.137] -0.829*** [0.183] -0.779*** [0.101] -1.583*** [0.066]
Precision machinery products -1.202*** [0.110] -0.503*** [0.142] -0.292*** [0.078] -2.178*** [0.064]
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -1.935*** [0.153] -1.231*** [0.217] -0.896*** [0.094] -3.021*** [0.103]
Other transport equipment -1.736*** [0.131] -1.140*** [0.185] -0.314*** [0.082] -3.212*** [0.088]
Furniture and manufacturing n.e.c. -1.867*** [0.160] -1.517*** [0.237] -1.174*** [0.121] -3.331*** [0.083]
GATT24 (t−1) Enabling Clause (t−1) WTO GSP
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Coefficients in Lagged GATT24 Dummy Variables in Tariff Rates 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
Notes: Solid and dashed lines show point estimates and 95% confidential estimates, respectively. 
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Figure 2. Coefficients in Lagged Enabling Clause Dummy Variables in Tariff Rates 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
Notes: Solid and dashed lines show point estimates and 95% confidential estimates, respectively. 
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Figure 3. Coefficients in Lagged GATT24 Dummy Variables in NTBs 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
Notes: Solid and dashed lines show point estimates and 95% confidential estimates, respectively. 
  
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
 25 
Figure 4. Coefficients in Lagged Enabling Clause Dummy Variables in NTBs 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation 
Notes: Solid and dashed lines show point estimates and 95% confidential estimates, respectively. 
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